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Abstract
Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the
merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be pro…table. The
pro…tability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the dis-
criminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants.
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JEL classi…cation numbers: D44, L11, L13
1 Introduction
Competition is sometimes well described by a contest, particularly if compe-
tition via prices is not feasible. A typical example is the market for pharma-
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ceutical products. Price competition and most other means of competition
are not feasible in this market in many European countries, due to the spe-
ci…c payment structure of their health insurance system. However, producers
make promotional e¤ort sending sales representatives and gifts to physicians,
trying to persuade them to prescribe their products instead of competing sub-
stitutes.1 The e¤ort cost cannot be recovered, even if the promotion is not
successful. Similarly, …rms are forced into contests in markets for products
with price maintenance or price regulation by some government agency. This
is well documented, for instance in the insurance industry in several Euro-
pean countries prior to deregulation by the European Commission in 1994.2
In markets with price maintenance retailers may contest with each other and
spend resources in order to attract customers to buy from them, and not
from another retailer. The type of e¤ort di¤ers from one market to another:
visiting and persuasive talking to customers in the insurance retail business,
glamorous shop outlets and huge selections of goods in others.
Other important contest examples are …rms competing for a monopoly
as in R&D contests (see, e.g., Bagwell and Staiger 1997), contests for quasi-
1Breyer and Zweifel (1999, p. 366) report that marketing and product information
were about 20 percent of revenue through sales in pharmacies in Switzerland in the mid-
eighties, almost half of these being marketing expenditure and argue that this percentage
is much higher than that of other industries.
2For instance, Rees and Kessner (1999) survey regulation in the German insurance
market prior to 1994. They report some evidence for price regulation that led to prices
that considerably exceeded cost, leading to a contest in sales e¤ort that was su¢ciently
strong to make the regulator feel a need for regulating the maximum sales expenditure. The
regulator required that agents’ commissions were not to exceed 11 percent of premiums,
and total marketing expenditure was restricted to no more than 30 percent of premiums.
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monopoly due to network externalities (Besen and Farrell 1994), litigation
contests for brand names, internet addresses or other exclusive assets that
yield quasi-monopoly rents, exporting …rms competing for large scale projects
as in Konrad (1999), or …rms seeking special political favors in rent-seeking
contests. In all these cases …rms spend e¤ort to attain some payo¤ or “prize.”
Firms win this prize with some probability that is a function of the various
e¤orts of the di¤erent …rms, and the e¤ort cannot be recovered, whether a
…rm wins the prize or not.
One may ask whether …rms gain in these contests if some of them “join
forces,” whereas others stay independent. For instance, two pharmaceutical
…rms in a market with n …rms may merge, or …rms in an R&D contest may
merge. They may decide to fuse their research labs, or may coordinate their
research expenditure in separate research labs. This type of merger ques-
tion has received considerable attention for two types of market structures,
Bertrand and Cournot competition. In these competition games, merger is
always bene…cial for the …rms not involved in the merger. Merging …rms may
gain or lose. With Bertrand competition, …rms’ price choices are strategic
complements and, accordingly, merger of a subgroup of …rms is bene…cial
for them (Deneckere and Davidson 1985). The results are ambiguous for
Cournot competition, merger being more likely to bene…t the merging …rms
if the number of merging …rms is large relative to the number of …rms not
involved in the merger (Salant, Switzer and Reynolds 1983, and Gaudet and
Salant 1991) and if costs are convex (Perry and Porter 1985).
A major di¤erence between Bertrand and Cournot games on one side
and contest games on the other is the change in the competition game that is
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induced by the merger. With a merger in Bertrand and Cournot competition
(or perfect collusion with side payments between a subgroup of competitors),
the merged …rms can be considered as one single strategic player deciding
about a single strategic variable. Merger therefore reduces the number of
competitors in the game. The reduction in competitors typically increases
overall industry pro…ts, but reduces the share in these pro…ts which is earned
by the merged …rms.3
With contests, it is less clear whether merger or cooperation between two
contestants will reduce the overall number of contestants. Suppose n …rms
are in a contest. Each …rm spends contest e¤ort and the prize of the contest is
awarded to the di¤erent …rms with probabilities that depend on these e¤orts.
If two …rms merge, in some cases they may become one single contestant.
This may be true, for instance, in rent-seeking or lobbying contests, and in
situations in which …rms’ products become indistinguishable after the merger.
Alternatively, two …rms may continue to act as two contest participants in
the game, even after the merger. For instance, in an R&D contest for a
drastic innovation, the merging …rms may still run two research labs, or
…rms may still run two separate product lines and separate organizations
of sales representatives promoting the two products. The merger will make
them choose the optimal contest e¤orts di¤erently in these cases, since they
know that they partially compete against themselves.
Accordingly, we will pursue the problem in two separate sections, referring
3As is typically assumed in the merger literature, we disregard any direct cost ad-
vantages or disadvantages in the merger, in order to concentrate on the strategic market
structure aspects.
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to fusion if two merged …rms become a single contestant, and to collusion if
the two merged …rms continue to represent two contestants after the merger.
We show that merger between a given number of contestants is, in general,
more pro…table for the involved …rms, if the contest is “discriminatory” in
the sense that, at the equilibrium contest e¤ort levels, a contestant’s increase
in contest e¤ort has a large impact on the contestant’s win probability.
2 Contests
Consider a market with n symmetric …rms. Suppose that these …rms make
e¤orts in a contest for some prize of size B. A few examples for this type
of competition have been discussed in the introduction. Each …rm i chooses
contest e¤ort xi 2 [0;1) which is sunk and cannot be recovered, whether the
…rm wins the contest or not. Contest e¤orts determine …rms’ probabilities qi
of winning the prize, according to a contest success function
qi(x1; :::; xn) =
(xi)aPn
j=1(xj)a
for a < n=(n¡ 1). (1)
This function has been suggested by Tullock (1980) and is a special case of
more general contest success functions qi(x1; :::; xn) but has gained support
by an axiomatization in Skaperdas (1996). We call the coe¢cient a in (1) the
discriminatory power of the contest success function. It is a measure of how
much the contest outcome can be in‡uenced by contest e¤ort, and how much
is left to chance. For instance, if a! 0, each contestant has the same chance
of winning, irrespective of contest e¤orts. If, instead, a! 1, (1) approaches
a contest success function in which the contestant who makes the highest
e¤ort wins for sure. We limit the discriminatory power to a 2 [0; nn¡1) in
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order to have well-behaved optimization problems with equilibria in pure
strategies and …rst-order conditions characterizing these equilibria.4
Firms are risk neutral. Their (expected) payo¤s are
¼i = qiB ¡ xi. (2)
Firm i wins the prize B with probability qi and spends contest e¤ort equal to
xi. The …rst-order condition for …rms maximizing their payo¤s and symmetry
can be used to calculate the contest equilibrium e¤orts
x¤(n) =
aB(n¡ 1)
n2
. (3)
The equilibrium win probability is 1=n for each contestant, yielding the equi-
librium payo¤s as
¼¤(n) =
B
n
¡ aB(n¡ 1)
n2
. (4)
3 Fusion
We …rst consider the case in which the merger reduces the number of con-
testants in the contest. This case corresponds to the assumption in the
literature on merger in Bertrand or Cournot markets that two …rms that
merge behave as one strategic player deciding about one strategic variable
in the post-merger market. The alternative case in which merged …rms will
enter the contest success function as separate contestants will be considered
later.
4For the equilibrium (in mixed strategies) for the case of a > n=(n ¡ 1) see Baye,
Kovenock and deVries (1994).
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Suppose m < n …rms merge, implying that the number of contestants
reduces from n to n¡m+1. Let N be the set of all …rms and M be the set
of …rms that merge. Prior to the merger, the merging …rms received a payo¤
equal to m¼¤(n). After the merger their payo¤ equals
¼¤(n¡m+ 1) = B
n¡m+ 1 ¡
aB(n¡m)
(n¡m+ 1)2 :
Now let g(n;m; a) be the function that measures the gain (or loss) of m …rms
that merge in an industry composed of n …rms. Accordingly, g(n;m; a) is
given by
g(n;m; a) = ¼¤(n¡m+ 1) ¡m¼¤(n)
=
B
n¡m+ 1 ¡
aB(n¡m)
(n¡m+ 1)2 ¡m
µ
B
n
¡ aB(n¡ 1)
n2
¶
,
and has the following properties:
(i) For all n ¸ 2 it holds that g(n; 1; a) = 0: (If one …rm is joined by no other
in a merger, the pro…t doesn’t change.)
(ii) For all n ¸ 2 and for all a > 0 it holds that g(n; n; a) = Bn a(n¡ 1) > 0:
(Merger to monopoly is always pro…table.)
(iii) For all n ¸ 2 it holds that @g(n;m;a)@m
¯¯¯
m=1
= Bn3 (2a+n¡2an+an2¡n2) S 0
i¤ a S n(n¡1)(n¡1)2+1
¡
< nn¡1 for n ¸ 2
¢
:
(iv) For all n ¸ 4 and for all a 2 £0; nn¡1¢ it holds that
@2g(n;m; a)
@m2
= 2B
n¡m+ 1 ¡ a(n¡m¡ 2)
(n¡m+ 1)4 > 0;
i.e., g(n;m; a) is strictly convex (and also continuous) with regard to
m:
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With the help of properties (i) ¡ (iv) we can prove the following
Proposition 1 (A) If there are 3 …rms in the premerger equilibrium, then
a bilateral merger is pro…table if and only if a 2 ¡67 ; 32¢ :
(B) For any number n of …rms, there is a critical discriminatory power
a0(n) such that merger with m · n ¡ 1 is never pro…table for all contests
with a · a0(n).
(C) Let a 2
³
0; n(n¡1)(n¡1)2+1
´
and n ¸ 4: Then the following two statements
hold true: If a merger by a speci…ed number of …rms is not pro…table for the
merging …rms, a merger by a smaller number of …rms is also not pro…table.
If a merger by a speci…ed number of …rms is pro…table for them, a merger by
a larger number of …rms is also pro…table.
(D) If a 2
h
n(n¡1)
(n¡1)2+1 ;
n
n¡1
´
then for any number n ¸ 4 of …rms in the
premerger equilibrium, a merger by any number m = 2; 3; :::; n of …rms is
pro…table.
Proof: For part (A) note that g(3; 2; a) = B36 (7a¡ 6). For part (B) note
that lima!0 g(n;m; a) = ¡ (n¡m)(m¡1)n(n¡m+1) B < 0. The proof of part (C) follows
the lines of proof of result D in Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983): prop-
erties (i) and (iii) imply that g(n;m; a) becomes negative for small m > 1 if
a < n(n¡1)(n¡1)2+1 : According to property (iv), g(n;m; a) is continuous and strictly
convex with regard to m. Thus, because of property (ii), there is a unique
y¤ < n such that g(n; y¤; a) = 0 and the result follows. Finally, for the proof
of (D), note that in this case properties (i); (ii); (iii) and (iv) imply that
g(n;m; a) > 0 for all m = 2; 3; :::; n: ¤
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Proposition 1 shows that the pro…tability of the type of merger considered
here depends on the discriminatory power of the contest. If the discrimina-
tory power is small, merger of many …rms can be pro…table whereas merger
of few …rms is not. If the discriminatory power of the contest is very small,
fusion is pro…table only if all …rms merge. If, in contrast, the discriminatory
power is high, merger—of any number of …rms—is always pro…table.
Intuitively, fusion in contests has two e¤ects. First, it increases total
pro…t of the industry, because total contest e¤ort is reduced with a reduction
in the number of contestants. Second, the share of this pro…t that goes to the
merging group of …rms is reduced. If the discriminatory power is very small,
e.g., close to zero, then total e¤ort in the equilibrium becomes negligible in
comparison to the contest prize, and industry pro…t becomes almost equal
to B and increases only in…nitesimally as a result of merger. In that case m
merger candidates earn almost mB=n prior to merger, while, if they merge,
their joint payo¤ decreases to roughly B=(n ¡ m + 1): Hence, the second
e¤ect dominates and merger is not pro…table. On the other hand, with large
discriminatory power, the e¤ect of merger on total industry pro…t becomes
more important. The …rst e¤ect dominates the second and merger becomes
pro…table.
4 Collusion
In many contests a merger between …rms does not reduce the number of
contestants. For instance, consider R&D contests. Let N be the set of all
…rms, with #N = n, let M be the set of …rms that merge, with #M = m,
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and let U = NnM be the set of unmerged …rms. The merged …rms may keep
separate research labs working on the same research problem. Similarly,
takeovers or mergers in insurance markets often do not imply that these
companies amalgamate their sales departments. Invariance of the number of
contest players with respect to merger is likely to occur if the merging …rms
stay as separate entities with a joint headquarter, or if merger is simply a
contract between the …rms according to which the …rms make all strategic
choices cooperatively and maximize their joint pro…t. When asking whether
…rms can gain from merger in this case, we can straightforwardly draw on the
literature on the pro…tability of merger with other types of competition. Two
types of e¤ects are at work. First, the merging …rms take into account that
an increase in contest e¤ort in, say, …rm i 2 M reduces the win probability
of all other …rms, including the win probability of all other …rms in M: This
latter e¤ect will be internalized, making …rm i behave less aggressively in the
contest, and so will all merging …rms. Second, the less aggressive behavior
of merged …rms changes the contest behavior of all other …rms.
If a merger does not change the number n of contestants, it nevertheless
changes the objective functions of the merged …rms. Instead of (2) they
maximize their joint payo¤ X
i2M
(qiB ¡ xi), (5)
whereas all …rms k 2 U not participating in the merger continue to maximize
their pro…ts as given in (2). The respective system of …rst–order conditions,
which by using symmetry reduces to a system of two equations in two un-
knowns, is not explicitly solvable. However, a comparative static analysis
is possible. If the …rms in M maximize (5), they take into account that
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@qi
@xj
< 0 for i 6= j holds, and therefore, coordination makes them reduce their
e¤ort compared to x¤(n): Let us consider the e¤ect of a symmetric marginal
reduction in e¤ort choices by the …rms in M on their equilibrium pro…ts.
Firms in U will react to this (anticipated) reduction in e¤ort. De…ne x as
the symmetric equilibrium level of e¤ort chosen by all k 2 U such that
¹x = »(x) ´argmax
xk¸0
fqkB ¡ xk j xi = x 8i 2 M and xj = ¹x 8j 2 Unfkgg .
We call »(x) the symmetric reaction function of the unmerged …rms (…rms
in U) for e¤ort choices of the merged …rms (…rms in M). This reaction
function is implicitly given by the …rst-order condition for a …rm in U and
can be written, making use of symmetry, as
a¹xa¡1((n¡m¡ 1)¹xa +mxa)B = ((n¡m)¹xa +mxa):
At the fully non-cooperative equilibrium x¤(n), the slope of the function ¹»(x)
is obtained by total di¤erentiation of this condition and equals
d¹»(x)
dx
¯¯¯¯
x=x¤
= ¡ am(n¡ 2)
(n¡ am)(n¡ 1) + am . (6)
Remark 1 The slope of the reaction function ¹»(x) as in (6) is strictly neg-
ative for all n ¸ 3 and m · n¡ 1. Furthermore, lima!0 ¹»0(x¤) = 0.
To see this, note that a · nn¡1 . The intuition for the result in Remark 1 is
as follows. As can be seen by inspecting ddxi¼i = 0 for a! 0, each contestant’s
marginal bene…t from spending additional e¤ort becomes in…nitely small.
Hence, a contestant would not like to spend much, even if other contestants
would increase their e¤ort considerably.
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Using the envelope theorem and the fact that @¼i@xk = ¡ 1n¡1 for i 6= k at the
fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium with e¤orts (3), the pro…t increase
of each …rm in the merging group M from a joint reduction in their contest
e¤ort x starting in (x¤; x¤) can be calculated and equals
¡d¼i
dx
=
1
n¡ 1((m¡ 1) + (n¡m)¹»
0(x¤)). (7)
Hence, a joint decrease in their e¤ort increases their pro…t if the direct e¤ect
of reduced e¤ort within the group outweighs the equilibrium reaction by the
unmerged …rms. This expression (7) to be positive is a necessary condition
for collusion to be pro…table. It resembles the condition that has been de-
rived in Gaudet and Salant (1991) who consider Cournot competition. The
pro…tability e¤ect of collusion is ambiguous in general. However, by Remark
1, we have
Proposition 2 A marginal joint reduction in e¤ort among colluding …rms
increases their pro…t if the discriminatory power of the contest is su¢ciently
small.
The intuition for the result in Proposition 2 is as follows. Collusion on
contest e¤ort leads to a reduction in e¤ort for the set of colluders. If this
reduction in e¤ort does not trigger an increase in other contestants’ e¤orts,
collusion is bene…cial. As has been noted in Remark 1, other contestants’
reaction to the colluding set’s e¤ort reduction is very moderate if the dis-
criminatory power of the contest is su¢ciently small.
Note that the pro…t change of an unmerged …rm k 2 U which results from
a joint reduction of the contest e¤ort x of …rms in M equals
¡d¼j
dx
=
1
n¡ 1(m+ (n¡m¡ 1)¹»
0(x¤)).
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Thus, a joint reduction of the contest e¤ort of …rms in M is always bene…cial
for the …rms not participating in the merger.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we consider the pro…tability of merger in contests. We con-
sider situations in which the merger leads to a reduction in the number of
contest participants (fusion) and situations in which the merger merely leads
to coordinated e¤ort choices within a subgroup of contestants, but does not
change the number of contestants. This type of merger is called collusion.
The pro…tability e¤ect of merger for the merging group of …rms is di¤erent for
the two types of merger. Whereas high discriminatory power of the contest
makes fusion pro…table, a necessary condition for collusion to be pro…table
is more likely to be ful…lled if the discriminatory power of contests is low.
When …rms merge, it can be expected that they have a choice as regards
whether the merger leads to a fusion or to mere collusion between merged
entities. The structure of the contest will therefore be important for this
decision, fusions being more likely if the discriminatory power of the contest
is su¢ciently high.
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